

Small Donor Matching Programs

Examining Past Case Studies to Propose an Improved S.B. 1424

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ABSTRACT

Small donor matching programs are an increasingly popular campaign finance reform policy tool that aims to increase diversity and elevate underrepresented voices among donors, voters, and candidates. We compare the characteristics of long-standing donor matching laws with those of five new programs introduced since 2015. We also review the existing literature on small donor matching programs in New York, NY and Los Angeles, CA to argue that they generally achieve their goals of fostering diversity and representation. We draw from our research to offer recommendations for Illinois's small donor matching bill, S.B. 1424.

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I. Introduction

In recent decades, public financing of electoral campaigns has emerged as a way to check the influence of large private donations over politics. While prior efforts at campaign finance reform have attempted to place limits on contributions and spending, 2010's *Citizens United v. FEC* decision declared such policies unconstitutional,¹ leading reformers to look away from mitigating directly the influence of large donors, and toward amplifying the voices of small donors. This paper focuses on a newly popular form of public financing: small donor matching programs.

Matching programs use public funds to match all monetary donations within a certain range given to qualifying candidates. For example, a donation of \$50 under a 5:1 match rate would be accompanied by \$250 from a public election fund, for a total yield of \$300 for the candidate. In order to reap the benefits of these programs, candidates must first demonstrate legitimacy by raising a designated number of small donations before contributions to their campaign can be matched by the government. Candidates are typically also required to agree to a set of rules -- including a spending cap and proper use for funds -- before qualifying for matching. While all of these parameters -- matching rates, minimum qualifying contributions, and rules for participating candidates -- vary by program, the general structure of small donor matching programs remains constant.

Along with amplifying the voices of small donors, almost all small donor matching programs include in their stated goals a desire to reduce the influence -- both actual and perceived -- of wealthy political donors, push candidates to spend more time interacting with constituents, and lower the barriers to entry for candidates without substantial personal wealth.²

The concept of small donor matching is not entirely new -- the first one was passed in Tucson, AZ in 1987 and they existed in nine total municipalities before 2015³ -- but as city and county legislatures attempt to move towards cleaner elections, at least five more have been passed in the last 3 years, including in Montgomery County, MD (2015); Portland, OR (2016); Howard County, MD (2017); Washington, D.C. (2017); and Prince George's County, MD (2018).

The amount of concrete research on the effects and effectiveness of these programs, however, is severely lacking. Of all small donor matching programs in effect, only those in New York, NY and Los Angeles, CA have been substantially studied and evaluated by researchers. This paper draws on the existing research on those two cities' programs to report the extent to which small donor matching programs have accomplished their stated goals. It also presents the key details of the set of small donor matching laws passed since 2015, in the hope that if those programs are studied as rigorously as New York's and Los Angeles's, policymakers can begin to draw inferences on how the varying characteristics of a matching program affect its ability to diversify donor and candidate pools and amplify underrepresented voices.

1 *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)

2 Michael J. Malbin and Michael Parrott, "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles," *The Forum* 15, no. 2 (2017): 4.

3 See Demos, "Public Funding for Electoral Campaigns," 2017.

II. Overview of Small Donor Matching Programs

Since all matching programs share some common principles and mechanics, any small donor matching law can be characterized by a few key provisions:

Matching rate (MR): The rate at which a donor's funds are matched with public funds, typically between 4:1 and 6:1. For example, in a city with a 6:1 matching rate, an individual donation of \$10 will be accompanied by a government donation of \$60 for a total donation of \$70.

Maximum public funds payments (MPFP): The maximum contribution a candidate may receive from public funds. If small donors continue to contribute to a candidate who has reached this limit, those donations will not be matched.

Contribution limits (CL): The highest amount a candidate may receive from an individual donor. Some programs also have minimum contribution requirements that a candidate must meet before receiving any matching funds.

Spending limits (SL): The maximum amount of funds a campaign may spend during the course of the election.

The requirements necessary to qualify for and enter a matching program vary, but typically include a two-part contribution threshold, where candidates must collect a minimum amount of contributions from a minimum number of donors. Once candidates enter the program, they are often held to strict campaign spending limits and must abide by strict disclosure requirements.

Table 1 presents summaries of a sample of currently-operating small donor matching programs. We examine New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the municipalities that have passed matching laws since 2015.

Table 1. Characteristics of small donor matching laws in selected cities and counties⁴

Location (Year); ⁵ Code	Matching rate (MR) & Maximum public funds payments (MPFP)	Contribution limits (CL) & Spending limits (SL)	Applicable positions	Candidate eligibility requirements
<p>New York City, NY (1988); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 3-703</p>	<p>MR: 6:1 up to \$175 MPFP: 55 percent of a candidate’s spending limit</p>	<p>CL: range from \$2,850- \$5,100 and apply to all campaigns, regardless of participation in the program. All candidates are prohibited from accepting contributions from corporations and LLCs SL: vary by position, ranging from \$190,000-\$7,286,000.</p>	<p>Mayor, Comptroller, City Council, Public Advocate, Borough President</p>	<p>1. Meet a two-part fundraising threshold consisting of a min. aggregate amount of funds (ranging from \$5k-\$250k) and a min. number of contributors (ranging from 75- 1,000). Thresholds vary by position. 2. Be on the ballot, and have an opponent on the ballot.</p>
<p>Los Angeles, CA (1992); L.A. Mun. Code §§ 49.7.1</p>	<p>MR: 4:1 up to \$500 for Citywide candidates, 4:1 up to \$250 for City Council candidates MPFP: 80% of average spending by winning candidates in last 2 cycles</p>	<p>CL: \$250 SL: Spending limits vary by position and the election type⁶</p>	<p>Mayor, City Attorney, Controller, City Council</p>	<p>1. Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds range from 2,500 donations totalling \$75,000 to 25,000 donations totalling \$1,500,000.</p>
<p>San Francisco, CA (2002); S.F. Cam. & G.C. Code § 1.144</p>	<p>MR: Varies, depending on candidate status (see Appendix 1, Tables 1 and 2) MPFP: Mayor (incumbent: \$962,500, challenger: \$975,000), Supervisor (incumbent: \$152,500, challenger: \$155,000)</p>	<p>CL: \$500 SL: Mayor (\$1,475,000), Supervisor (\$250,000)</p>	<p>Mayor, Supervisor</p>	<p>1. Be opposed by a candidate who has qualified for public financing or by a candidate who has received contributions or made expenditures greater than or equal to \$10,000 2. Agree to participate in at least three debates 3. Incumbents must raise \$75,000+ from 750+ donors, \$50,000+ from 500+ donors for challengers</p>

⁴ This list includes all small donor matching programs for which information was readily available.

⁵ The year funding first became/becomes available.

⁶ Mayor (primary: \$2,906,000, general: \$2,323,000), City Attorney (primary: \$1,307,000, general: \$1,017,000), Controller (primary: \$1,162,000, general: \$872,000), City Council (primary: \$498,000, general: \$415,000)

<p>Washington, D.C. (2018); D.C. Off. Code § 1–1163</p>	<p>MR: 5:1</p> <p>MPFP: 160% of average cost of running a winning campaign</p>	<p>CL: \$200, \$20 minimum</p> <p>SL: Not reported.</p>	<p>Mayor, Attorney General, Council Chair, Ward Seat, At-Large Seat</p>	<p>Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds vary by position.</p>
<p>Montgomery County, MD (2018); M.C. Code § 16-18</p>	<p>MR: For County Executive: 6:1 - 1st \$50, 4:1 - 2nd \$50, 2:1 - 3rd \$50</p> <p>For County Council: 4:1 - 1st \$50, 3:1 - 2nd \$50, 2:1 - 3rd \$50</p> <p>MPFP: County Executive (\$700,000), County Council (\$85,000)</p>	<p>CL: \$150, \$5 minimum</p> <p>SL: Not reported.</p>	<p>County Executive, County Council</p>	<p>1. Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds range from 125 donations totalling \$10,000 to 500 donations totalling \$40,000.</p> <p>2. Accept no donation greater than \$150</p>
<p>Portland, OR (2019); City Code Ch. 2.16</p>	<p>MR: 6:1 up to first \$50</p> <p>MPFP: Not reported</p>	<p>CL: \$250</p> <p>SL: None</p>	<p>Mayor, Commissioner, Auditor</p>	<p>Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds vary by position.</p>
<p>Howard County, MD (2022); H.C. Code of Ord. § 10.300</p>	<p>MR: For County Executive: 6:1 - 1st \$50, 4:1 - 2nd \$50, 2:1 - 3rd \$50</p> <p>For County Council: 4:1 - 1st \$50, 3:1 - 2nd \$50, 2:1 - 3rd \$50</p> <p>MPFP: County Executive (\$700,000), County Council (\$85,000)</p>	<p>CL: \$150, \$5 minimum</p> <p>SL: Not reported.</p>	<p>County Executive, County Council</p>	<p>1. Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds range from 125 donations totalling \$10,000 to 500 donations totalling \$40,000.</p> <p>2. Accept no donation greater than \$150</p>
<p>Prince George’s County, MD (TBD)</p>	<p>MR: 7:1 - 1st \$25, 2:1 - next \$125</p> <p>MPFP: County Executive (\$1,000,000), At-Large County Council (\$250,000), District Council (\$75,000)</p>	<p>CL: \$150</p> <p>SL: Not reported.</p>	<p>County Executive, At-Large County Council, District Council</p>	<p>1. Meet a two-part fundraising threshold. Thresholds range from 150 donations totalling \$7,500 to 500 donations totalling \$40,000.</p> <p>2. Accept no donation greater than \$150</p>

III. Small Donor Matching Programs and Donors

As discussed in the introduction, the stated goals of almost all matching programs include reducing influence -- both actual and perceived -- of wealthy political donors, compelling candidates to interact more with constituents, and lowering the barriers to entry for candidates without substantial personal wealth. Many programs, Los Angeles included, list promoting “diversity” of both donors and candidates as a primary goal,⁷ but that term tends to be defined differently by various governments and researchers, and sometimes it is not defined at all. We will adopt Malbin and Parrott (2017)’s definition of “diversity”: the extent to which the racial, socioeconomic, and geographic distributions of both donors and candidates represent those same distributions of the relevant municipality as a whole.⁸

New York City

Each time New York City increased its matching ratio -- from one-to-one to four-to-one, then to six-to-one -- its program became more effective at diversifying the donor base and amplifying underrepresented voices.⁹ Comparing the four-to-one and six-to-one systems to the one-to-one system, there is a substantial increase in the number and proportion of small donors (those giving between \$1–\$250) per City Council candidate. Incumbents raised money from 27 percent more small donors under the multiple-matching systems, challengers from 56 percent more small donors, and open seat candidates from 20 percent more small donors. When New York City switched from the four-to-one match to the six-to-one match, new donors became involved in the election process. In 2005, 11 percent of participating council candidates’ money came from citizens donating between \$1–\$174. In 2009, this percentage rose to 21 percent. This represents a 55 percent increase in the number of small donors between 2005 and 2009.

This increase in donor participation also led to a change in the demographics of donors.¹⁰ Small donors (those giving \$250 or less) came from 89 percent of the census block groups in the city, while mid-range donors (\$251–\$999) came from 29 percent of block groups and large donors (\$1,000 or more) came from only 14 percent of block groups. Block groups with small donors had lower median incomes than block groups with mid-range donors or large donors. Block groups with small donors also had higher levels of poverty, higher percentages of non-whites, higher percentages of adult residents who did not complete high school, and lower percentages of adult residents with a bachelor’s degree or beyond. All of these groups that are better represented among small donors than large donors, and therefore empowered by the matching program, are also groups that are typically underrepresented in voter turnout.

The effects of NYC’s matching program continue to hold up when city elections are compared to state elections.¹¹ Compared to the 2010 State Assembly election, which did not have a matching program, the 2009 NYC City Council election involved more diverse donors. Comparing City

7 Michael J. Malbin and Michael Parrott, "Small Donor Empowerment Depends on the Details: Comparing Matching Fund Programs in New York and Los Angeles," *The Forum* 15, no. 2 (2017): 4

8 *Ibid.* 26

9 Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, and Brendan Glavin, "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States," *Election Law Journal* 11, 1 (2012): 3-20.

10 *Ibid.*

11 Elisabeth Genn, Michael J. Malbin, Sundeep Iyer, and Brendan Glavin, "Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds," *Brennan Center for Justice* (2012). 13

Council and State Assembly races allows us to look at the donation patterns of the same city residents across different elections in electoral districts that are similar in size.¹² Candidates for City Council in 2009 raised small contributions from 89 percent of the city's census block groups. By contrast, candidates who ran for State Assembly in 2010 received small donor support from only 30 percent of the city's block groups. Not only did City Council candidates gather donations from more block groups, they also gathered donations from more people within each block group. The City Council election involved 20 times more block groups with more than five donors than the State Assembly election. Moreover, block groups with a small donor presence were about four times as likely to have only one small donor in the State Assembly election as in the City Council election.

Compared to the State Assembly election, the census block groups from the City Council election were also a better representation of the average city block in each respective voting population (city or state). In other words, the City Council election's small-donor block groups were closer to the citywide average in income, poverty rate, education level, and percentage of minority residents, than the State Assembly election's block groups were to the statewide average.¹³ In terms of racial representation, specifically, small donors in the City Council election came from block groups with an average non-white population on 54%, strikingly close to the whole city's 55%.¹⁴ This representation is abnormal, as most elections, including the State Assembly show a disproportionately high percentage of white donors.¹⁵

Los Angeles

When looking at the effects of small donor matching in Los Angeles, most reports draw conclusions from comparisons between before and after the matching reforms, implemented in 2013, rather than before and after the implementation of the original program. In the original implementation, matching rates were 1:1, and they were later increased to 2:1 for primary elections and 4:1 for general elections in 2013.

Comparing two pairs of election cycles, 2009-2011 and 2013-2015, before and after the donor matching reform, three criteria signify a movement towards more accurate city representation from the first pair to the second: household incomes, poverty rates, and the percentages of non-white residents in small donor (\$100-250 only, due to data restrictions) census block groups (CBGs) all moved significantly closer to the citywide percentages.¹⁶ In short, small donor CBGs have higher non-white percentages and are less wealthy than large donor CBGs.

Aside from these changes in voter representation, however, the LA small donor matching program does not seem to have increased the role of small donors in local elections. Comparing the average number of small donors per 100,000 constituents in 2009-2011 elections to the same number in 2013-2015 elections, the Campaign Finance Institute found that the only statistically significant change occurred for incumbent candidates, who actually saw a *decrease* in the average number of

12 While there are significant differences between City Council and State Assembly elections, the similarities between CC and SA electoral districts inspire confidence that the comparison is meaningful (See Ibid. 9)

13 Ibid. 15

14 Ibid. 16

15 American National Election Studies. Gave Money to a Political Campaign, 1952-2008: Percent Among Demographic. The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior.

16 The median household income, expressed as a percentage of the citywide median, in small donor CBGs decreased from 131% to 116%; the poverty rate, as a percentage of the citywide median, increased from 59% to 76%; and the percentage of non-white residents, as a percentage of the citywide median, increased from 79% to 92%.

small donors. Overall, CFI concludes that this increase in donor matching rates had little to no impact on either the number or the proportional role of donors.

IV. Small Donor Matching Programs and Candidates

Small donor matching programs have similar aims for candidates as for donors -- to increase the diversity of the pool of candidates running, and to empower candidates from underrepresented groups to run. The literature on New York and Los Angeles suggests that their matching programs achieve those goals effectively, although with results that are not so significant as those observed on donors.

New York City

During the 2009 New York City election, 93 percent of primary candidates and 66 percent of general election candidates participated in the matching program.¹⁷ These rates were sustained four years later in 2013, when 92 percent of candidates in the primary election and nearly 90 percent of candidates in the general election participated.¹⁸

The New York City program allows candidates without large personal wealth to run competitive campaigns against privately-funded candidates who receive support from large donors. In one such example, in an open primary for comptroller, a publicly-funded candidate faced a challenge from a well-known, wealthy private-funded candidate who spent \$10 million. With public funds, the participant ran an effective campaign and won the election.¹⁹

While such success stories do illustrate the potential of small donor matching programs to increase the competitiveness of elections, a Campaign Finance Institute study finds that “there is little evidence that contested elections are more competitive or that incumbent reelection rates have declined.”²⁰ Though small donor matching does increase the number of candidates running and decrease the number of uncontested elections, that does not necessarily mean those elections become more competitive.²¹

As for the racial diversity of candidates running under the New York City small donor matching program, the evidence is unclear. While surveys and anecdotal evidence have showed minority candidates running for office because of the program (where they would not have run otherwise), there is not yet any quantitative evidence supporting or refuting a change in the diversity of candidates.

17 Angela Migally and Susan Liss, "Small Donor Matching Funds: The NYC Election Experience," Brennan Center for Justice (2010).

18 "2013 Post-Election Report," New York City Campaign Finance Board (2014).

19 Ibid.

20 Michael J. Malbin, Citizen Funding for Elections. Report. Campaign Finance Institute. Washington, D.C.: Campaign Finance Institute, 2015. 19

21 Ibid 19

Los Angeles

The Los Angeles small donor matching program has seen a steady rise in participation between 1993 (the program's first implementation) and 2001 (*See* Appendix 2, Graph 1 and Chart 1).²² This rise occurred among all candidates, as well as only among "serious" candidates, where a serious candidate is defined as one who raised at least \$5,000.²³ The number of serious candidates participating in the program (though not necessarily receiving matching funds) reached almost 100% in 1999 and 2001, with only one out of 30 not participating in 1999 and two out of 56 in 2001.²⁴ In addition to a growth in overall participation, LA has also seen a dramatic rise in the number of candidates receiving funds. In the first four regular elections after implementation, 1993-1999, 25-53% of candidates received matching funds. Then, in 2001, 70% of candidates received matching funds (*See* Appendix 2, Chart 2).²⁵

The small donor matching program in LA also decreased the influence of non-individual donors on elections. In the three general elections between 1981 and 1985, before implementation, business sources accounted for approximately 64% of contributions to City Council incumbents and 26% for challengers.²⁶ Between 1993 and 1997, however, the percentage of donations from business sources fell to 38% for Council incumbents and 17% for challengers.²⁷ In short, City Council candidates became less reliant on business contributions.

Despite success in reducing the influence of business interests, participation in the small donor matching program did not reduce the amount of time spent on fundraising for the vast majority of candidates. The program was designed with the notion that setting spending limits would decrease the importance of money, thereby decreasing the amount of time candidates and elected officials spent raising money and increasing the amount of time they discussed issues, interacted with constituents, and/or performed their duties as an official. However, according to interviews conducted with participating candidates between 1993 and 2001, almost all worked near, at, or even above full-time to raise money.

While the LA small donor matching program has shown to be effective in the few areas discussed, a significant lack of available data still stands in the way of reaching conclusions which are more recent and more relevant to import, persisting questions about this program, like how it affects the diversity of the candidate pool, whether it has any significant impact on which candidate wins, and if it pushes candidates to better represent their constituents once elected.

22 Paul Ryan, "Eleven Years of Reform: Many Successes -- More to Be Done," Center for Governmental Studies, 2001.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

V. Looking Back at SB 1424: Policy Recommendations

Based on research literature and the results of currently-running successful small donor matching programs, we propose the following recommendations to strengthen the small donor program proposed in Illinois's SB 1424. While possible changes to SB 1424 were the impetus for this paper, its recommendations are founded in research into many small donor matching programs and therefore may be useful recommendations for any such program.

1. Remove or reduce the \$25 minimum threshold for qualified contributions

SB 1424 defines qualified contributions to be “not less than \$25 and not greater than the initial \$150 of any contribution made by a qualified contributor.” \$25 can represent a significant amount of money for individuals who are not currently politically engaged or are low-income. \$25 is the highest minimum contribution amount of the numerous small donor matching programs we examined, with many programs having no lower bound at all.

2. Add an initial aggregate qualifying contribution amount to the eligibility requirements

SB 1424 defines eligibility requirements by the number of qualifying contributions. We propose adding a minimum aggregate value of contributions in addition to a minimum number of donations to ensure applicants are sufficiently competitive. This two-part fundraising threshold is used by a number of cities, including New York City. We propose the following thresholds based on the \$75 midpoint of qualifying contributions:

- \$75,000 from qualified contributions for candidates for Governor
- \$37,500 from qualified contributions for candidates for Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, State Comptroller, State Treasurer, and Secretary of State
- \$15,000 from qualified contributions for candidates for State Senator
- \$7,500 from qualified contributions for candidates for State Representative

3. Loosen eligibility requirements for non-incumbent candidates

Incumbents hold a financial advantage in collecting contributions when running for reelection.²⁸ Lowering the eligibility thresholds for non-incumbent candidates would decrease barriers to entry for new candidates. The San Francisco small donor matching program has such a requirement: incumbents must raise at least \$15,000 in qualifying contributions from at least 150 residents to qualify for the program, while non-incumbents need only raise \$10,000 in qualifying contributions from at least 100 residents.

4. Amend eligibility requirements in Sec. 9A-30(a) to require participating candidates to face opponents who qualify for public financing, have spent a certain threshold, or have earned contributions of a certain threshold

To ensure public funds are spent on candidates in competitive races, we propose qualifying candidates not only face opposition, but also face opposition from candidates who qualify for public financing or have spent or collected contributions totalling a certain threshold. This threshold may be defined as a certain percentage of the maximum potential amount of matching funds payments for which the candidate is eligible in that election (e.g. 10% of a possible \$1,475,000 the candidate

²⁸ Alexander Fournaies and Andrew B. Hall, "The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences," *The Journal of Politics* 76, 3 (July 2014): 711-724.

may receive in matching funds). Under this recommendation, candidates shall not be eligible to receive matching funds unless and until one of the three conditions is fulfilled by their opponent(s).

5. Require participating candidates to participate in two debates and/or town halls

While a small donor matching program may succeed in amplifying the voices of everyday voters, it is also important to ensure voters are informed. Requiring candidates to publicly present their ideas and respond to questions from their constituents will help citizens determine who best represents them and deserves their contributions. This requirement is used in San Francisco, where candidates in the program must agree to participate in at least three debates with opponents.

6. Allow for flexibility in increasing the program’s contribution limits, funding limits, and/or matching ratios

When matching programs fail, it is often because their limits were too strict, making it difficult for participating candidates to run a competition campaign. This occurred in the case of the presidential public financing system, which has broken down in recent years. The program failed to modernize in response to the dramatic growth in the cost of campaigns. As a result, over time, the costs of running a competitive presidential campaign greatly exceeded the amount of public funds available for candidates. The matching programs in Los Angeles and Washington D.C. remain flexible by adjusting maximum public funds payments based on the costs associated with recent campaigns.

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VII. Appendix 1

Table 1: Small Donor Matching Rates for Mayor in San Francisco, CA

	Private Funds Raised by Non-Incumbents	Matching Public Funds	Private Funds Raised by Incumbents	Matching Public Funds
Initial	\$50,000	\$100,000	\$75,000	\$100,000
1:2	\$425,000	\$850,000	\$425,000	\$850,000
1:1	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$12,500	\$12,500
Total	\$500,000	\$975,000	\$512,500	\$962,500
Total Public and Private Funds	\$1,475,000		\$1,475,000	

Table 2: Small Donor Matching Rates for Supervisor in San Francisco, CA

	Private Funds Raised by Non-Incumbents	Matching Public Funds	Private Funds Raised by Incumbents	Matching Public Funds
Initial	\$10,000	\$20,000	\$15,000	\$20,000
1:2	\$50,000	\$100,000	\$50,000	\$100,000
1:1	\$35,000	\$35,000	\$32,500	\$32,500
Total	\$95,000	\$155,000	\$97,500	\$152,500
Total Public and Private Funds	\$250,000		\$250,000	

VIII. Appendix 2

Graph 1: “Serious” Candidate Participation in Los Angeles, 1993-2001




Chart 1: Candidate Participation in Los Angeles, 1993-2001

Candidate Participation					
	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001
Total Candidates	71	23	27	41	64
Candidates Agreeing to Spending Limits	58 82%	14 61%	22 81%	36 88%	59 92%
Total “Serious” Candidates^{iv}	53	20	19	30	56
“Serious” Candidates Agreeing to Spending Limits	47 89%	11 55%	15 79%	29 97%	54 96%
Candidates Receiving Public Funds	28 39%	5 22%	6 22%	14 34%	39 61%
“Serious” Candidates Receiving Public Funds	28 53%	5 25%	6 32%	14 47%	39 70%

Chart 2: Candidates Receiving Matching Funds in Los Angeles, 1992-2001

Candidate Receipt of Matching Funds						
<u>Year</u>	Total Participating Council Candidates	Participating Council Candidates Receiving Matching Funds	Council Candidates Receiving Maximum Matching Funds Available	Total Participating Citywide Candidates	Participating Citywide Candidates Receiving Matching Funds	Citywide Candidates Receiving Maximum Matching Funds Available
1993	Primary: 35 General: 8	Primary: 20 General: 8	Primary: 3 General: 0	Primary: 19 General: 1	Primary: 7 General: 1	Primary: 1 General: 1
1995	Primary: 14 General: 2	Primary: 5 General: 2	Primary: 3 General: 0			
1997	Primary: 16 General: 2	Primary: 4 General: 2	Primary: 1 General: 0	Primary: 6 General: N/A ^v	Primary: 2 General: N/A ^{vi}	Primary: 1 General: N/A ^{vii}
1999	Primary: 37 General: 6	Primary: 14 General: 6	Primary: 1 General: 0			
2001	Primary: 46 General: 9	Primary: 29 General: 9	Primary: 3 General: 0	Primary: 23 General: 4	Primary: 10 General: 4	Primary: 4 General: 4
<u>Total</u>	Primary: 148 General: 27	Primary: 72 General: 27	Primary: 11 General: 0	Primary: 48 General: 5	Primary: 19 General: 5	Primary: 6 General: 5

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